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shows that the General government structural balances as a percent of potential GDP (SBGDP) in Greece and Portugal are different from Ireland and Spain.
The last row contains the mean and standard deviation in the pre crisis period 1998 -2007 . In Greece and Portugal the SBGDP have been on average twice as high as in the Euro area, whereas in Spain the SBGDP have been significantly lower and in Ireland they have been similar to the Euro area. Table 2 What facilitated the growth in the debt was the availability of cheap credit in the international financial markets. As a result, the Spanish economy, which needed virtually no foreign funding in 1996, became a borrower. In 2008 total net borrowing from the rest of the world was 9.1 % GDP.
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When housing prices fell, the banks -which financed the housing sector -were 
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Quantitative summary of the role of the private sector in the European Crises:
Growth, Housing price appreciation/capital gains and low interest rates
In Ireland and Spain, unlike Greece and Portugal, the private sector -housing and banks -was the origin of the debt crisis. Table 3 and figure 1 provide a quantitative summary of this phenomenon among countries.
The low world rates of interest and high domestic growth led to a rise in housing prices. In the period 1991-2000 the growth rates in Ireland and Spain were very high, and generated a boom in housing prices. Table 3 indicates the large capital gains resulting from investment in housing in
Ireland and Spain, relative to the Euro area. The mean capital gain was Ireland 13.2%, Spain 9.71% and the Euro area 5.16%. Irish and Spanish banks borrowed abroad at low rates of interest (see figure 1 ) and loaned these funds to the housing industry. The anticipated return was the marginal product of capital plus the anticipated capital gain.
Investors within and without the Euro area ignored the default risk and creditors in the Euro area did not have to consider an exchange rate risk. 
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Role of the Capital Market
The capital market assumed that, since these countries are in the Euro area/common currency, there is neither an exchange rate risk nor a default risk. The capital market treated these countries alike insofar as interest rates were concerned, and did not charge countries a risk premium relative to the rest of the Euro area during the The situation only changed when Lehman Brothers failed. Then the CDS rates and interest rates on Greek and Irish securities rose. The conclusion is that the market for bonds denominated in Euros did not reflect doubts about default until quite late in the crisis. There were not Early Warning Signals that were used by the markets. The precipitating factor in the recognition of default risk in Europe was the failure of Lehman Brothers. By then it was too late.
The ignoring of default risk stands in contrast with the U.S. experience where, despite having a common currency, the market evaluates municipalities according to the default risk. Neither the Treasury nor the Federal Reserve intervenes in the fiscal policies of the municipalities nor contemplates bailouts when they are experiencing difficulties in servicing their debts. Table 4 presents the distribution of ratings, and hence interest rates that the capital market charges the various U.S. municipalities. Unlike Europe the discipline comes from the markets and not from the government.
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Figure 1 Interest rate spreads versus the Bund The capital gains are described in Table 3 and the interest rates in figure 1 . The huge capital gains in housing for Spain and Ireland, and low interest rates, during the period 2002-2006 led to a rise in the debt ratio of the private sector. That is, the term in brackets was large so the private housing sector increased its debt directly to banks and indirectly to foreign investors. The investment in housing seemed to be profitable because the debt could be refinanced/repaid from the recent capital gains -not from the marginal product of capital. But these capital gains -housing price appreciation in 
Early Warning Signals of an Excessive Private debt ratio likely to lead to a debt crisis
The optimum debt ratio of the private sector, such as the housing sector, should maximize the expected logarithm of net worth at a terminal time. This is a risk averse strategy because losses are more heavily weighted than are gains. The future capital gains and interest rates are unknown when the debt is incurred. This is a problem of stochastic optimal control SOC discussed in Stein (2006 Stein ( )(2011 . It is reasonable to assume that the capital gains consists of a trend/drift plus a stochastic (probabilistic) term, and the interest rate also has a trend/drift plus a stochastic (probabilistic) term, and that these two stochastic variables are negatively correlated.
On the basis of the SOC analysis, the optimal ratio of debt/net worth (in the box below) has the following form. It is equal to the trend of the capital gain less the trend of the interest rate plus the current return on assets less a risk premium, all of that multiplied by risk factors consisting of variances of the capital gains, interest rates and the correlation between these stochastic terms. It is not the current or recent capital gains and interest rates that are relevant but their trends/drifts over a longer period. The leverage, assets/net worth, is one plus the debt ratio.
Diversity of Debt Crises in Europe 13
Optimal debt/net worth = [drift capital gain -drift interest rate + current return on assets -risk premium](Risk factors).
Early Warning signal = excess debt = actual less optimal debt ratio.
Two important implications of the SOC analysis are as follows. (1) The expected growth of net worth is maximal when the optimal debt ratio -stated in the box -is selected. (2) As the actual debt ratio rises above the optimum, the expected growth declines and the risk rises. This type of Warning Signal is clearly seen in the US mortgage crisis. Figure 2 plots a unit free measure of the actual debt ratio DEBTRATIO and a unit free measure of the optimal ratio RENTPRICE. In the US the drifts/trend of the capital gains and interest rate were approximately equal. RENTPRICE reflects the current return on assets. The variables are normalized/unit free, they are deviations from their long term means divided by the standard deviation The details of the calculation are in Stein (2010)(2011).
An excessive debt of the households is seen (figure 2) when the normalized debt ratio rises relative to the normalized value of the current return on assets, marginal product of capital. From 2002 to 2006, the return on assets declined more than one standard deviation below its long term mean while the debt ratio rose two standard deviations above its long term mean. This excessive debt, DEBTRATIO -RENTPRICE, signaled a situation where the debt can only be serviced from unsustainable capital gains.
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Figure 2. United States. RENTPRICE, normalized rental income/index of housing prices, reflects the marginal product of capital. DEBTRATIO is the normalized household debt/disposable income. A normalized variable is (Variable -mean)/standard deviation. Each curve is measured in standard deviations from its own mean. Excessive debt is DEBTRATIO -RENTPRICE, the difference between the two curves. This is an early warning signal of a crisis.
The situations in Ireland and Spain 2003-2006 , seen particularly in Table 3, led to an excess debt -because the housing sector and the banks assumed that the recent capital gains -far above their trends -were sustainable. This was similar to the S&L crisis in the US in the 1980s and mortgage crises of 2007. The excess debt is an early warning signal of a crisis. In these countries, the decline in net worth, bankruptcy of the housing sector, led to the insolvency of the banking sector and then led to the bailout. The rise in government debt was simply an exchange of government debt for private debt.
Diversity of Debt Crises in Europe 15
Fiscal deficit and public debt
Unlike Ireland and Spain, the debt crises in Greece and Portugal were due to the government sector. Tables 1 and 2 showed these differences. The SGP rule had no value in predicting the Irish and Spanish crises, but clearly deficits and debt ratios are relevant in the cases of Greece and Portugal. It is instructive to consider specifically the case of Greece, though Portuguese case was similar. According to Bank of Greece staff projections, the debt dynamics is unfavorable, as it is estimated that the fiscal adjustment envisaged will only lead to a stabilization of the debt-to-GDP ratio in 2014, at very high levels (over 130%), on the basis of conservative assumptions regarding nominal GDP growth over the next few years and the nominal interest rate on public debt. It is estimated that reducing the debt ratio to below 100% of GDP will require a systematic fiscal effort over a number of years, at a time when it is essential to restart the growth process and ensure that strong economic performance is restored within a reasonable time frame. A social security Diversity of Debt Crises in Europe 16 reform capable of successfully meeting future challenges, the strict implementation of the fiscal consolidation plan and the promotion of structural reforms and growth-enhancing initiatives constitute the only option.
General Principle evaluating the government debt ratio
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)/Maastricht Treaty
The appropriate policies, to prevent a recurrence and/or to remedy the crisis, depend upon the origin of the "excessive debt". It seemed to the EU that adherence to the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)/Maastricht Treaty would prevent debt crises. This hope was belied by recent events. Proposals for reform are still focused upon these rules limiting government budget deficits. The SGP rules are not based upon economic analysis but are arbitrary. They come from an identity linking the growth rate of the economy, the budget deficit/GDP and the debt/GDP. This identity will be satisfied if the debt ratio, budget deficit/GDP, stabilizes at any arbitrary constant level.
Budget deficit/GDP = (Growth rate)(Debt/GDP).
Given an arbitrary growth rate, this identity only determines the ratio (budget deficit)/debt. If the growth rate is 5% pa, and the deficit is constant at 3% pa then the debt ratio would be constant at 60%. If the deficit is constant at 6% then the debt ratio will be 120%. The EU and IMF still use the 60% debt ratio as a target for policy. These values have nothing to do with whether the debt is optimal or "excessive" and are irrelevant as early warning signals of a crisis such as Europe has experienced.
It is not possible to establish an optimal debt ratio -and hence excess debt ratiofor the government, as it was for the private sector. However, the focus should be on the trend of debt burden, defined as interest payments on the debt/GDP. Budget deficits should be viewed in terms of their effects upon the GDP. Will the borrowing/increase in debt raise the productivity of the economy by more than the interest rate? If the marginal productivity exceeds the interest rate, the debt burden -interest payments/GDP -will decline. For example, in the CEEC countries tax rates can be lowered which increase the government debt. However, the decline in tax rates may lead to FDI which increases the Diversity of Debt Crises in Europe 17 productivity of the economy. Similarly, the government may increase expenditures for education, health and infrastructure, which raise productivity. Alternatively, the government expenditures/tax reductions may simply stimulate consumption. For example, low rent housing, subsidies, wage increases will not raise the GDP. Since the interest payments exceed the marginal productivity of expenditure, the debt burden rises.
Therefore the focus should be upon the trend of the government debt. Table 2 last row shows that the ratio of government debt/GDP from 1998 to 2007 was: Portugal 1.42, Greece 1.16 whereas in Spain it was 0.53 and in Ireland it was 0.43. This is a clear example of the origin of crises should be viewed.
Repercussions in financial markets
It is difficult to separate bank debt from government debt when the governments have bailed out banks. The government/taxpayer takes over the role of the debtor. There is reason to combine the two debtors. Table 4 displays the debts of the banks and governments.
Debtor is listed in row and creditor in column. Thus Spain owed $220 billion to the French and $238 billion to the Germans. The major creditors were the French and German banks. The major creditors for Ireland were Britain and Germany. Last column is total debt to all countries in addition to those in the table.
When the crises occurred in Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Spain, whether due to the government or the private sector, defaults occurred or were threatened. If Spain defaulted then assets of the British, French and German banks/government declined in value. If the Irish defaulted, the British and German banks/government were affected. 
Conclusions
The main causes of the debt crises in Europe varied by country. In Ireland and in Spain, they were mainly due to the private sector, particularly housing. These crises had great similarity to those in the US: the S&L crisis, the agricultural crisis in the 1980s and the mortgage crisis in 2007-08. In Greece and Portugal, the cyclically adjusted structural deficit was the major cause.
In Ireland and Spain, the domestic housing booms were financed from foreign borrowing. The creditors failed to require a risk premium related to the probability of default. The anticipated return was the sum of the marginal product of capital plus an anticipated capital gain or asset price appreciation. The marginal product of capital was below the rate of interest. The debt was anticipated to be refinanced from the capital Diversity of Debt Crises in Europe 19 gains in excess of the interest rate, not from current earnings. The anticipated capital gains were based upon recent experience, which was unsustainable. The debts were excessive -the actual exceeded the optimal derived from stochastic optimal control.
When the capital gain fell below the rate of interest, the borrowers in the housing industry defaulted. Their creditors were the banks who in turn were debtors to international lenders.
On the basis of the Stochastic Optimal Control analysis, the optimal ratio of debt/net worth of the private sector has the following form. It is equal to the trend of the capital gain less the trend of the interest rate plus the current return on assets less a risk premium, all of that multiplied by risk factors consisting of variances of the capital gains, interest rates and the correlation between these stochastic terms. It is not the current or recent capital gains and interest rates that are relevant but their trends/drifts over a longer period. An early warning signal EWS of a debt crisis is a significant excess debtthe actual less the optimal debt ratio.
A sensible EWS for the excess government debt is the trend of the debt burdeninterest payments/GDP. Insofar as the government deficits have a marginal product above the interest rate, the debt burden will tend to decline. Insofar as the budget deficits have marginal productivities below the interest rate, the debt burden will rise. In the cases of Greece and Portugal the trend was highly positive, and in Spain and Ireland the trend was negative.
